
In the crowded ranks of the men who searched for Sir John Franklin after his disappearance in the Arctic in the mid-1840s, Captain Richard Collinson has not hitherto been prominent. Although his expedition in the HMS Enterprise, which lasted from 1850 to 1855, was one of the lengthiest made in this service, it yielded little new geographical knowledge. The expeditions of Dr. John Rae and Commander Robert M’Clure had covered almost all of the same ground, in some cases only weeks earlier. Nor did Collinson succeed in finding definitive proof of Franklin’s whereabouts, despite being no farther than 50 km away, during the winter of 1852–53, from the human and material remains that Captain Leopold McClintock would find on King William Island in 1859. Yet the expedition was notable in one respect: all four executive officers on board were under arrest when Enterprise emerged from the Arctic in August 1854. In Arctic Hell-Ship, Barr aims to investigate this situation. He also gives a general account of the expedition, the first since Collinson’s own narrative was published posthumously by his brother, Major-General Thomas Collinson, in 1889.

The HMS Enterprise left England in January 1850, in tandem with the HMS Investigator, which was under M’Clure’s command. The Admiralty had yoked the two vessels together for the sake of safety, but they were separated in the Pacific Ocean after traversing the Straits of Magellan. Enterprise was slower to reach the Arctic and met with resistance in pressing eastwards. She spent the first winter in Hong Kong before re-engaging with the ice in the autumn of 1851. Attempting to head north through Prince of Wales Strait, Collinson found Melville Sound choked with ice and settled on a wintering location on the western coast of Victoria Island. The next summer, Collinson sailed through Dolphin and Union Strait and overwintered at Cambridge Bay. Sledge parties pressed farther into the Passage to explore the eastern coast of Victoria Island. Collinson turned west the next summer, but spent one more winter in the ice, at Camden Bay in Alaska, before departing the Arctic in the summer of 1854.

Barr has engaged with the available source material much more thoroughly than perhaps any scholar to date. He consults Collinson’s two manuscript journals and the journal of the Second Master, Francis Skead, just as Clive Holland (1982) has done in his assessment of Collinson. Pierre Berton (1988) refers to Skead as well. But Barr has also made use of another shipboard journal, the one written by Richard Shingleton, the gun-room steward. Additionally, he has mined the expedition’s official documents—the Letter Book, Night Order Book, and the like—that were submitted to the Admiralty at the end of the voyage. His judgments are well informed both by this immediate material and by his familiarity with the history of 19th-century Arctic exploration, about which he has written several other books.

The quotidian experiences of the expedition are recounted in a precise, detailed manner. Of greater interest was Barr’s handling of the interpersonal conflicts. In the book’s preface, John R. Bockstoce notes that personality clashes occurring on lengthy expeditions in remote places remain underanalyzed. While other authors have dismissed the happenings aboard Enterprise as the inevitable consequence of living in a hostile environment, or as simple bad luck, Barr chooses to take them seriously. He argues that both Collinson and the officers exacerbated the situation, but that the former’s paranoia, occasional inebriation, and inconsistent behaviour contributed most to the deterioration of relations. He demonstrates that the majority of the officers’ offenses were so minor in nature as to be scarcely worth the punishments they received. Relevant passages from the primary documents are reproduced at length so that readers may weigh the evidence for themselves. In this way, Barr generously lays his conclusions open to dispute.

Yet the narrative promise of such interesting material is left unfulfilled. The publishers’ blurb promises a “gripping tale,” and the introduction seems to set the tone accordingly. Barr quotes from the journal of Philip Sharpe, the mate of HMS Rattlesnake, who beheld the condition of the Enterprise’s men in 1854 in astonishment: “Oh! The accounts are horrible; we thought our own plight was bad enough, but it is nothing compared to this. …. Never was there an expedition set sail under such auspicious auspices, had such golden opportunities which were thrown away; and made such signal failures” (p. x). Barr’s dispassionate approach, while admirable from a scholarly perspective, dampens the material’s visceral impact. Although many of the chapters are rounded off with a promise of heightened tension ahead, the authorial tone remained consistently disinterested.

The book’s material qualities are praiseworthy. It is one of the most attractively designed academic books, within and without, of recent date. Its maps are clear and helpful, although they might have been placed earlier within their respective chapters for ease of reference. Arctic Hell-Ship also boasts 17 colour illustrations from the archives of the Scott Polar Research Institute at the University of Cambridge. Exquisite in both execution and reproduction, these images add strongly to the book’s interest and value. Four typos (“offices” in place of “officers” occurred thrice) and several incorrect references to the page numbers of illustrations do not mar the book’s overall presentation.

Arctic Hell-Ship will please serious scholars of Arctic exploration, for whom it is primarily intended. It is a well-researched and meticulous reassessment of one expedition among many that searched for Franklin and his men. It is one of Barr’s more readily accessible books, in that it synthesizes material rather than presenting primary sources directly to readers. Yet I still would not recommend it to anyone unacquainted with the particulars of Arctic exploration, if
not the Franklin search itself. For those who have this background knowledge, however, it is a necessary read.

REFERENCES


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How do Inuit fit into the Canadian political system? This was the crucial question for the period addressed in Kiumajut. Are Inuit to be considered as Indians, their rights addressed in the Royal Proclamation of 1763? Or are they outside that proclamation, their lands having been under Hudson Bay Company rule at the time of the proclamation? Should Inuit be subject to game laws? Should game laws be designed to support the age-old Inuit way of life, or to control Inuit and compel them to adopt modern ways?

Kulchyski and Tester tackle these and related questions in an unabashed attempt to revise the history of Canadian governmental policy and practice in the Arctic. Rather than portraying a steady progression of improvements and recognition culminating with the creation of Nunavut, they catalogue a seemingly endless series of missteps and misunderstandings, together with a stream of opinion and invective masquerading as scientific findings. The result was the demise of self-sufficient bands of hunters living on the land, yielding hardship and starvation on the way towards the creation of permanent settlements designed for bureaucratic convenience rather than for the Inuit way of life.

The authors have documented the story with impressive thoroughness, supplementing archival and official materials with interviews with Inuit who lived through much of the period in question, particularly the 1950s and 1960s, when the clash between officialdom and custom came to a head. The words of RCMP officers, community development officers, wildlife biologists, government officials, and others provide a strong contemporary voice throughout the book. The flaws in logic and errors in fact that Kulchyski and Tester describe are apparent in the record of the time and not merely with benefit of hindsight.

How, then, did such poor information and argumentation determine the development of policy? The authors frame their history around the concept of “totalization: to incorporate by absorption or to expel by banishment any traces of social difference or social forms not ultimately conducive to the accumulation of capital” (p. 10). Whether such a concept is indeed an accurate portrayal of Canadian policy and practice is beyond the scope of the book (and certainly beyond this reviewer!). Having outlined their theoretical approach briefly in the Introduction, Kulchyski and Tester largely keep it out of sight for the remainder of the book. Nonetheless, the interpretation of the material depends a great deal on how one approaches it, and the theory remains influential throughout the book.

Kulchyski and Tester offer a welcome re-analysis of the events and consequences surrounding Canadian policy and practice with regard to Inuit, particularly through the mechanism of game management. The book should stimulate discussion, reaction, and further research and interpretation of crucial events in Canadian and Arctic history. In this way, Kiumajut reminds me of Yuri Slezkine’s Arctic Mirrors (1994), which demonstrated how Russia’s Arctic indigenous peoples have typically been viewed in light of prevailing social theories in central Russia, rather than as societies in their own right with their own values and systems. While Kiumajut dismantles the standard history of Inuit-state relations, it nonetheless replaces one theoretical lens with another.

The Inuit voice suggested by the title is captured in the book through the use of quotations from interviews and photographs of the speakers. The quotes function to provide some additional perspective, to fill omissions in the written and official records, and to add local depth to the narrative. Nonetheless, their role is neither central nor indispensable, and Kiumajut should not be taken as an attempt at an Inuit history. Indeed, a weakness of the book is a rather uncritical regard for Inuit views contrasted with a highly critical (though not always negative) review of everyone else’s role and words. Take, for example, a statement on page 119: “The result might have been entirely embarrassing for an administration that, in its attempts to regulate and control Inuit hunting without the wisdom, insight, and input of Inuit hunters, had codified itself into a tight—and incredibly silly—corner.”

Inuit can do no wrong, and the bureaucrats, biologists, and others can rarely do right. Milton Freeman (1989) describes similar controversies over caribou in the 1970s (after the period covered by Kiumajut), but provides a more compelling interpretation of the motivation of the biologists responsible for what he considers “gaffs.” Kulchyski and Tester give John Kelsall, a caribou biologist, the chief villain’s role for flawed studies, apparently willful misinterpretation, and the continual portrayal of Inuit as unrestrained and wasteful slaughterers of wildlife. They do not, however, attempt to uncover why Kelsall did...